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Federal Review, Finality of State Court 
Decisions, and a Proposal for a National Court 
of Appeals-A State Judge's Solution to a 
Continuing Problem 
James Duke Cameron* 
Under the federal supremacy clause,' not only must state 
courts apply federal law where appropriate, but they are subject 
to review by the federal courts when federal law is applied im- 
properly. Although state judges may disagree with particular de- 
cisions of the federal courts, state judges should have no quarrel 
with federal review of state court decisions involving federal 
questions. If there is to be any semblance of uniformity in the 
application of federal constitutional provisions by the state 
courts, it is inevitable, if not desirable, that federal courts, and 
particularly the United States Supreme Court, have the last 
word. Unfortunately, because of the manner in which federal re- 
view of state court decisions is exercised, state cases involving 
federal constitutional questions are no longer final, and excessive 
delay is commonplace, particularly in criminal cases. The result- 
ing confusion and delay in the application of federal law by the 
state courts have detracted from the prestige of the state courts 
and eroded the force and effect of state court decisions. Assurn- 
ing that the achievement of consistency, predictability, and rea- 
sonably prompt finality in state court decisions can be compati- 
* Justice, Arizona Supreme Court. A.B., 1950, University of California, Berkeley; 
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versity of Arizona College of Law, for his help and assistance. I wish also to thank Judge 
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quire for reading the initial draft of this Article and for their kind suggestions. The sub- 
ject matter of this paper has been discussed previously in the American Bar Association 
Journal. Cameron, National Court of State Appeals: A View from the States, 65 
A.B.A.J. 709 (1979). Special acknowledgment is made to Daniel J. Meador, James 
Monroe Professor of Law, University of Virginia, for his critical evaluation and helpful 
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. 1. U.S. CONST. art. VI, c1. 2. 
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ble with federal review, this Article will discuss a proposed 
solution which, although designed to benefit the state judicial 
systems, would also assist the federal judicial system. 
When we became a nation, routine review by the federal 
courts of state court decisions was not contemplated, and there 
is some question whether the framers of the Constitution envi- 
sioned the establishment of federal trial courts at all, leaving to 
the state trial courts the responsibility of deciding federal ques- 
tions in a trial setting. The Judiciary Act of 1789,' however, cre- 
ated thirteen federal district courts, divided into three circ~its .~ 
The resulting system was simple enough: state cases were tried 
in state courts, and federal cases, what few there were, were 
tried in federal courts. Our population was agrarian and small, 
commerce among the new states was limited, and the right to 
travel was a little-used privilege under our federal Constitution. 
That the law in one state was different from the law of a sister 
state was of little concern to the citizens or the courts. Professor 
Daniel Meador has commented: 
In the first decade of its existence, the Supreme Court re- 
viewed only seven state court decisions, and for the next sev- 
eral decades it reviewed about an average of one state judg- 
ment a year. The state judges, by virtue of the Federal 
Supremacy Clause, were compelled to apply federal law when- 
ever it came into play, but federal law was so skimpy in the 
early decades that this posed little or no added burden on the 
state judges.' 
This pattern began to change during the Reconstruction pe- 
riod that followed the War Between the States. In 1867 Congress 
gave federal courts jurisdiction over petitions for writs of habeas 
corpus filed by state prisoners,' and in 1868 ratification of the 
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution imposed due process 
and equal protection upon the states as a matter of federal law. 
2. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1850). 
3. Id. $5 2, 4. Each circuit court consisted of two Supreme Court justices and one 
district judge. 
4. Address by Daniel J. Meador, The Federal Government and the State Courts, 
The Robert Houghwout Jackson Lecture before the National College of the Judiciary, 
Reno, Nevada 5 (Oct. 14, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Meador Speech]. 
5. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 5 1, 14 Stat. 385 (1868). 
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In 1908 the Supreme Court, in Ex parte Y o ~ n g , ~  held that 
federal courts could enjoin state officials from conduct that vio- 
lated the United States Constitution. This gave the federal 
courts substantial power and jurisdiction, requiring them to su- 
pervise the constitutionality of state officials' activities. Thus, 
federal district court judges have the power to hear evidence, 
make factual determinations, and issue injunctions. As a practi- 
cal matter, these powers are in some respects greater than those 
enjoyed by the United States Supreme Court. The result has 
been the expansion of the business of the federal courts. 
This interest of federal courts in state matters-the result 
of a cooperative venture among the United States Congress, the 
executive branch of the federal government, and the federal ju- 
diciary-came about during a period in which federal power was 
increasing and becoming more centralized. This expansion of 
federal jurisdiction reflected a concern for minimum, if not uni- 
form, standards of justice for all citizens throughout the country, 
a concern that has continued to this day. As Justice Brennan 
has stated: 
In recent years, however, another variety of federal 
law-that fundamental law protecting all of us from the use of 
governmental powers in ways inconsistent with American con- 
ceptions of human liberty-has dramatically altered the grist 
of the state courts. Over the past two decades, decisions of the 
Supreme Court of the United States have returned to the fun- 
damental promises wrought by the blood of those who fought 
our War between the States, promises which were thereafter 
embodied in our fourteenth amendment-that the citizens of 
all our states are also and no less citizens of our United States, 
that this birthright guarantees our federal constitutional liber- 
ties against encroachment by governmental action at any level 
of our federal system, and that each of us is entitled to due 
process of law and the equal protection of the laws from our 
state governments no less than from our national one. . . . 
[Sltate courts no less than federal are and ought to be the 
guardians of our liberties.' 
The Task Force of the Conference of Chief Justices and the 
Conference of State Court Administrators, in its report on a 
State Justice Institute, noted that there is just as much national 
6. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
7. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. 
L. REV. 489, 490-91 (1977). 
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interest in the quality of justice as there is in the quality of 
health care or public education, and stated, "[Tlhe achievement 
of fair and equal rights as well as effective justice has always 
been thought of as an essential characteristic of American soci- 
e t ~ . " ~  Unfortunately, along with this concern for minimum na- 
tional standards has come the belief of some that federal courts 
offer the only solutions to certain problems.. 
Stating that problems can be remedied only in the federal 
courts is but another way of saying that state judges are unable 
to adequately address federal questions in the state courts. Pro- 
fessor Meador has noted that one of the "speculated" theories 
for the habeas corpus decisions was the Supreme Court's lack of 
confidence in state judges.1° Indeed, in the debate on the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871, Congressman Coburn stated: "The United 
States courts are further above mere local influence than the 
county courts; their judges can act with more independence, 
cannot be put under terror, as local judges can; their sympathies 
are not so nearly identified with those of the vicinage . . . . ,911 
And Professor Neuborne has claimed that "parity" between the 
state and federal courts in the enforcement of federal rights is a 
"dangerous myth."12 
Judge Aldisert has suggested that the low public image of 
the state courts is a result of academia and the media rather 
than an actual difference in the quality of the two court systems: 
There are significant reasons for the present infatuation 
with federal courts as the preferred forum for litigation. First, 
there is the influence of academia, exercised by the law profes- 
sors and their captive audiences, the law students. A basic no- 
tion of modern legal academia is that the federal judiciary is a 
unique institution: That somehow the law is different there, or 
the proceedings more conducive to reasoned disposition; that 
8. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, REPORT OF THE STATE-FEDERAL RELATIONS 
TASK FORCE JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES AND CONFERENCE 
OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS 5 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Task Force Report]. 
9. Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105-06 (1977). 
10. Meador, The Impact of Federal Habeas Corpus on State Trial Procedures, 52 
VA. L. REV. 286, 290-91 (1966). 
11. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 460 (1871). 
12. Neuborne, supra note 9, at 1105. 
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there is no politics in the appointment of federal judges; that 
federal judges come into their robes by a process akin to im- 
maculate conception; that all federal judges are meritoroius 
fountainheads of wisdom, whereas their state court counter- 
parts are political hacks who happened to stump for a guberna- 
torial winner. . . . 
Preference for federal courts is also reinforced by the poor 
public image of state courts. Although there is some profes- 
sional literature, very few public accounts today praise the 
state judiciary. The media continually emphasizes the state ju- 
diciary's shortcomings; and the resulting public impression is 
that state courts do not amount to much, and the most con- 
structive, judge-made, substantive law emanates from the 
United States Supreme Court or from the lower federal courts. 
Unfortunately, federal judges have not only fallen into the trap 
of believing their press notices, but are starting to say it 
them~elves.~~ 
Of course, not everyone believes state judges are inferior. 
Judge Donald P. Lay, of the Eighth Circuit, has noted, "It would 
be presumptuous to claim that federal judges are more compe- 
tent, conscientious, or learned than their state brethren in the 
area of federal rights."" And Professor A. E. Dick Howard, 
while admitting that the preference for federal courts is fre- 
quently based upon a distrust of state courts, notes that there is 
still support for the state courts: "To this day, the argument 
goes on between those who look to the federal courts as the pri- 
mary vindicator of federal rights and those who, noting that 
state judges also are sworn to uphold the Constitution, would 
repose more trust in the state tribunals."16 
The idea that the state judiciaries are inferior has played a 
greater role in congressional legislation and federal court deci- 
sions than is willingly admitted. At this point we might ask if 
the assumed inferiority of the state judiciaries has any substance 
in fact. Of course, when we compare the smaller (fewer than 800 
judges), better paid, and carefully selected federal judiciary with 
13. Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's 
Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 L. & Soc. ORD. 557, 
559. 
14. Lay, Modern Administrative Proposals for Federal Habeas Corpus: The Rights 
of Prisoners Preserved, 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 701, 716 (1972). 
15. A. HOWARD, I'LL SEE YOU IN COURT: THE STATES AND THE SUPREME COURT, CHAL- 
LENGE FOR THE STATES NO. 1, at 17 (National Governor's Association Center for Policy 
Research, Oct. 1980). 
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the many state judges at all levels of responsibility and jurisdic- 
tion, some selected by local and questionable political considera- 
tions, the comparisons are not always flattering to the state 
judges. But when comparing the state trial judges of courts of 
general jurisdiction with their counterparts on the federal dis- 
trict court bench, there is no reason to believe that the quality of 
state judges does not equal the quality of the federal judges, dif- 
ferences in tenure and compensation notwithstanding. 
The persons who should be in the best position to evaluate 
the performance of state judges, as compared to the performance 
of federal judges, are the lawyers who practice before the trial 
courts. These lawyers, who submit their clients' cases for deci- 
sion and who must rely upon the courts for their professional 
standing, as well as their professional income, should be in a po- 
sition to compare the two court systems. 
In order to ascertain their attitudes, a survey was made of 
ten jurisdictions in the United States: 
San Diego County (San Diego), California 
Gadsen County (Tallahassee), Florida 
Palm Beach County (Palm Beach), Florida 
Cook County (Chicago), Illinois 
Sangamon County (Springfield), Illinois 
Essex County (Newark), New Jersey 
Monmouth County (Freehold), New Jersey 
Bernalillo County (Albuquerque), New Mexico 
Spokane County (Spokane), Washington 
Milwaukee County (Milwaukee), Wisconsin. 
The jurisdictions were selected on the basis of geographical loca- 
tion and on the basis of differences in judicial selection 
processes. New Mexico, for example, is a state in which the 
judges stand for election in a political campaign.16 New Jersey 
was selected because it is not considered to have a "political ju- 
diciary"; it has a selection process more akin to the federal sys- 
tem." Also, there was an attempt to compare urban and rural 
counties in two states: New Jersey and Illinois. 
The clerks of the superior, district, or circuit courts in the 
selected state jurisdictions were asked to distribute a total of 
fifty questionnaires, one to each lawyer who had just filed a civil 
16. N.M. CONST. art. 6, 5 4. 
17. N.J. CONST. art. 6, 8 6, ll 1. 
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action in the state court.18 The attorneys were asked to state the 
nature of the case, for example, tort, contract, divorce, etc. They 
were then asked, "If there were no time or jurisdiction problems 
and you had a choice, would you have preferred to file this case 
in a federal court or in the state court?"le They were also asked 
to make such comments as they felt necessary. 
The actions were about equally divided among divorce (79), 
tort (71), and contract (74), with "other" accounting for 32 re- 
sponses. Of those responding, the preference was: 
d 
Federal court 34 
State court 193 
No preference 18 
When asked the reasons for their preferences, 11 of the 34 favor- 
ing the federal court and 48 of the 193 favoring state courts 
cited quicker disposition as the reason. Superior procedure and 
the quality of the judges were the second and third reasons for 
preferring the federal courts, while familiarity and convenience 
were the second and third reasons for preferring the state courts. 
When asked if the interest of their clients would be better 
served in the federal court or state court, the results were: 
Federal court 
State court 
No difference 
But when asked if the quality of the judges was better in the 
federal court or the state court, the results were: 
Federal court 
State court 
No difference 
Of interest is the fact that, out of the 95 who said the federal 
judges were of better quality, 58 still preferred to file in the state 
courts, and 28 thought the interests of their clients were better 
served in the state courts. The results of the survey are given in 
the Appendix to this Article. 
18. The matters were limited to civil cases because defense attorneys in criminal 
cases do not have a choice as to which court to appear in, and I assume they would be 
unhappy wherever they are forced to be at  a particular time. 
19. The one page questionnaire was contained in a stamped envelope addressed to 
me at my home address. There was no indication on the envelope or on the questionnaire 
that I was a state judge. The questionnaire did not have to be signed by the attorney, 
and although the county was indicated, the identity of the attorney was not known if he 
did not indicate it on the questionnaire. 
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A comparison of the results in four of the jurisdictions may 
be of interest. They include Essex (urban) and Monmouth (ru- 
ral) counties in New Jersey, a state in which judges are selected 
in a manner similar to that of the federal system; Bernalillo 
County, New Mexico, which has a political system of election; 
and Cook County, Illinois, where politics in the selection of 
judges is reputed to be intrusive: 
Cook County, Bernalillo Monmouth County, Essex County, 
Illinois County, N.M. New Jersey New Jersey 
(29 replies) (28 replies) (19 replies) (22 replies) 
Prefer to file in 
federal court 9 3 
Prefer to file in 
state court 16 23 
No preference 4 2 1 2 
Interest of client 
best served by: 
Federal court 7 5 1 
State court 10 12 14 
No difference 12 11 4 
Believe quality of 
judges is better in: 
Federal court 15 12 8 10 
State court 3 1 1 0 
No difference 11 13 8 12 
No answer: 2 No answer: 2 
Despite the differences in the selection processes, there appears 
to be no striking correlation between the selection process and 
the attitude of the bar toward state and federal judges. 
In fact, probably the most notable result of the survey in 
general is the lack of startling or conclusive differences that can 
be ascertained between state and federal judges or state and fed- 
eral courts. Answers to one of the questions, for example, indi- 
cate that more lawyers (95 to 30) thought that the quality of 
federal judges was better than the quality of state judges, but 
one-half of those who answered the question (125) thought there 
was no difference. The preference for state courts as a forum for 
their clients may be the result of the nature of the case and 
more familiarity on the part of the lawyer with the procedures 
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followed and the personnel of the court. The differences between 
the two systems, rather than differences between the quality of 
the judges, may well be the more important factor. In any event, 
the answers to the questionnaire do not indicate that either fed- 
eral or state judges are clearly superior in the perception of the 
lawyers. On the contrary, if the answers indicate anything at  all, 
it is that there is not a great deal of difference between the qual- 
ity of judges or justice in the two court systems. 
IV. UNWARRANTED F ERAL SUPERVISION F STATE COURT 
DECISIONS 
There being no great difference in the quality of judges or 
justice in the state and federal judiciaries, it may be questioned 
whether it is necessary for federal judges to review state court 
decisions to ensure that federal law will be enforced in the state 
courts. After all, state judges take an oath to uphold the Consti- 
tution of the United States as do federal judges, and state judges 
are just as capable of interpreting the Constitution and the deci- 
sions of the United States Supreme Court as are their brethren 
on the federal bench. Federal review, therefore, is not needed to 
ensure the quality of state court decisions; federal review is 
needed only to ensure consistency and uniformity in the applica- 
tion of federal constitutional standards in the state courts. The 
problem then is not that federal review of state court decisions 
involving federal questions is unnecesary; some form of federal 
review will always be necessary. The problem is that in discharg- 
ing this review function the federal courts are guilty of delay and 
inconsistency and often review beyond the degree needed to en- 
sure minimum federal standards of justice in the state courts, all 
to the detriment of state judicial systems. 
Hart & Wechsler cites the Hawk case as an example of en- 
tangled and protracted procedures between the state and federal 
courts.20 Henry Hawk was sentenced in 1936 by a Nebraska trial 
court to life imprisonment for murder. Sixteen years later, after 
numerous actions in both state and federal courts, including six 
trips to the United States Supreme Court, Hawk was finally or- 
dered discharged by a federal district court? 
20. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1490 (2d ed. 1973). 
21. Hawk v. O'Grady, 137 Neb. 639,290 N.W. 911 (1940)' cert. denied, 311 U.S. 645 
(1940); Hawk v. Olson, 130 F.2d 910 (8th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 697 (1943); Ex 
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Today a criminal defendant typically can take six steps af- 
ter a conviction in the state courts. (1) he may seek review by 
the state's appellate court (if there is an intermediate appellate 
court, there may be a two-stage appellate process), and (2) he 
may follow postconviction procedures in the state court that 
provide a basis for entry into the federal courts. Next, (3) the 
defendant can petition for a writ of certiorari or a direct appeal 
to the United States Supreme Court. If access to the United 
States Supreme Court is denied, as is most often the case, (4) 
the defendant then, by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, 
may go to the federal district court. If denied relief there, (5) he 
may appeal to the United States circuit court of appeals, and if 
he loses there, (6) he may go back again to the United States 
Supreme Court, this time from the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
The recent case of Greene v. Masseya2 is an example of 
these processes. In 1965, Greene and a codefendant, Sosa, were 
indicted for murder and were convicted. The conviction was set 
aside by the Florida Supreme Court," and a new trial ordered. 
The new trial was held, and Green was again convicted. This 
conviction was upheld by the Florida Court of Appeals against 
the defendant's double jeopardy claim.24 Greene then sought re- 
lief in the United States Supreme Court, which denied his peti- 
tion for a writ of ce r t i~ ra r i .~~  Greene next petitioned for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the federal district court, which was denied. 
From the federal district court, Greene went to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the 
federal district court.26 Again Greene petitioned to the United 
States Supreme Court, but this time certiorari was granted, and 
on June 14,1978, the United States Suppeme Court reversed the 
decision of the Fifth Cir~uit.~' But even this did not conclude 
parte Hawk, 318 U.S. 746 (1943); Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944); Hawk v. Olson, 
145 Neb. 306, 16 N.W.2d 181 (1944), reu'd, 326 US. 271 (1945); Hawk v. Olson, 146 Neb. 
875, 22 N.W.2d 136 (1946); Hawk v. Olson, 66 F. Supp. 195 (D. Neb. 1946), aff'd sub 
nom. Hawk v. Jones, 160 F.2d 807 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 779 (1947); 
Hawk v. State, 151 Neb. 717, 39 N.W.2d 561 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 923 (1950); 
Hawk v. Hann, 103 F. Supp. 138 (D. Neb. 1952). 
22. 437 U.S. 19 (1978). 
23. Sosa v. State, 215 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1968). 
24. Greene v. State, 302 So. 2d 202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974). 
25. Greene v. Florida, 421 U.S. 932 (1975). 
26. Greene v. Massey, 546 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1977). 
27. Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978). 
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the matter in the federal courts. The United States Supreme 
Court did not finally dispose of this case, but instead remanded 
it to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for a reinterpretation of 
the Florida Supreme Court decision of 1968 (some 10 years ear- 
lier) in light of later opinions of the United States Supreme 
Court. The United States Supreme Court stated: "The Court of 
Appeals will be free to direct further proceedings in the District 
Court or to certify unresolved questions of state law to the Flor- 
ida Supreme C o ~ r t . " ~ ~  
The delay and confusion caused by this method of federal 
review of state court decisions has resulted in what must be the 
most costly and inefficient system ever devised by man. Admit- 
tedly, we have grown callous to this delay, but I would suggest 
that it cannot be justified when viewed in the light of any rea- 
sonable concept of efficient administration. Some reform is nec- 
essary if the state courts, which decide 98.8% of the cases in this 
country,29 are to be able to apply federal law evenly and fairly, 
as the United States Constitution requires. The public and the 
parties are entitled to a reasonable, prompt determination of 
federal questions by a court that speaks uniformly and finally. 
As it is, there is neither promptness, finality, nor uniformity in 
federal review of state decisions. 
State judges can take little satisfaction from the fact that 
only a relatively few state cases are actually overturned by the 
federal courts. The state judiciaries, like their federal counter- 
parts, must depend upon public acceptance of their decisions to 
be effective. The damage done to the prestige of state courts and 
to the acceptability of their decisions is great. It is somewhat 
ironic that federal courts, in their stated desire to assure due 
process and equal protection to all citizens, are, by their efforts, 
robbing those citizens of some of the essential ingredients of due 
process and equal protection, to wit, speedy, final and predict- 
28. Id. at 27. 
29. A memorandum from Nora Blair of the National Center for State Courts to 
Francis J. Taillefer, Project Director, and National Courts Statistics Project 
(dated April 16, 1979 on file at National Center for State Courts) indicates that 
98.8% of current cases are handled in state courts. See also Sheran and Isaac- 
man, State Cases Belong in State Courts, 12 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1 (1978). 
Task Force Report, supra note 8, at 5 n.5. 
Our system is still structured on the basic premise that the state courts are 
the primary forums for deciding the controversies which arise in the great mass 
of day-to-day dealings among citizens. 
Meador Speech, supra note 4, at 10. 
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able justice, uniformly and consistently applied. Chief Justice 
Burger stated, "The criminal process should not extend over a 
span of three, five or seven years, with repeated appeals and re- 
peated collateral attacks on conviction~. At some point, there 
must be finality. Without finality, justice is a myth."s0 
If the delay is intolerable, so is the inconsistent application 
of federal law to the states by the federal courts. The state judi- 
cial system is generally consistent in its application of both state 
and federal law. The state's highest court is the last word on 
what the law is for that state, and it will be alert to the need for 
a unified and consistent body of state law. The result is a pre- 
dictable, uniform, and final system of law within the state. Such 
is not the case within the federal system. 
The law from circuit to circuit can be different, and basic 
United States constitutional questions can depend upon the fed- 
eral circuit in which the state happens to be located. The law 
within the circuit can also depend upon which panel of the cir- 
cuit hears the case. The confusion is even worse on the federal 
district level. In each state there may be just as many interpre- 
tations as there are federal district judges. Also, there can be 
different results where the petitions to the federal courts contain 
variant recitations of the facts of the case and the law to be ap- 
plied. This is not a criticism of the federal trial judiciary; most 
federal district judges attempt to harmonize the law of their dis- 
trict. However, except for the United States court of appeals, 
there is no unifying court over the district to enforce consistency 
in the same manner that a state supreme court does for the state 
courts. 
What has happened in the federal judiciary is that the sheer 
number of cases makes it impossible for the United States Su- 
preme Court to supervise effectively the state and federal judi- 
cial systems. Professors Carrington, Meador and Rosenberg have 
stated: 
The problem of national uniformity derives from a weak- 
pess in the federal appellate hierarchy. The weakness is a re- 
sult of overgrowth: the hegemony of the Supreme Court of the 
United States is too attenuated to be effective as the unifying 
arch of the structure. By combined force of number of cases 
and complexity, the national law has outgrown the Court's su- 
30. Address by Chief Justice Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary to 
the American Bar Association, Chicago, Illinois 8 (Feb. 3, 1980). 
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pervisory capacities. The Court is forced to scant many of the 
matters for which it bears the ultimate re~ponsibility.~~ 
As a possible solution to these problems, some observers 
suggest abolition of our dual system of justice. Professor Meador 
has compared recent trends with the consolidation of the courts 
in England: 
The accretion of federal jurisdiction, the growing dominance of 
the federal judiciary and the drawing together of the two sys- 
tems are reminiscent of developments in England centuries 
ago. After the Normans arrived and established the seeds of a 
central national government, there arose in England for the 
first time some central, national courts - Common Pleas, 
King's Bench, and the Exchequer. But at the beginning and for 
many, many years, these courts had very limited jurisdiction. 
The great bulk of everyday dispute settlement rested in the 
local courts of various sorts-county seats, feudal courts, and 
others. Gradually, however, as the centuries passed, the juris- 
diction of the central courts increased. By various procedural 
inventions and fictions they drew unto themselves an ever in- 
creasing amount of judicial business which previously had been 
in the hands of the local courts. Ultimately, the local courts 
were eclipsed, and the central courts became all embracing in 
their a u t h ~ r i t y . ~ ~  
It is Professor Meador's belief that the courts in the United 
States are presently in a period of transition and that the emer- 
gence of a federal structure quite different from the original 
state-federal design is not only possible but logical, as a strong 
federal judiciary, aided by Congress, asserts more federal au- 
thority over the state judiciarie~.~' Chief Justice Burger, while 
perceiving a dim outline of "state court dockets and federal 
dockets becoming more and more alike,"M cautions that "[tlhese 
observers may be in the position of a small boy looking down a 
stretch of straight railroad track when, by optical illusion, the 
rails seem to converge, but this presumption is not frivolous. 
31. P. CARRINGTON, D. &ADOR, & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL, 209 (1976). 
32. Meador Speech, supra note 4, at 13-14. 
33. Id. at 22-23. 
34. Address by Chief Justice Burger, Welcoming Remarks, American Law Institute, 
Washington, D.C. 2 (June 10, 1980). 
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Like symptoms of illness, we ignore them at our peril."35 
If uniformity alone is the goal, other countries provide ex- 
amples. As Professor Meador has pointed out, in Australia and 
Canada, state court decisions are reviewed by a federal tribunal 
that decides all legal questions, both state and federal. The Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany has no federal trial courts, the courts 
of first instance being provided by the states and reviewed in 
federal appellate courts.s6 Adoption of this mode in the United 
States would require a radical restructuring of our historical 
state-federal relationship. It is highly unlikely that this model 
would ever be adopted in this country, even if desirable. 
Since a merger of the two court systems is unlikely, unless 
radical measures are taken, the present dual system is likely to 
continue, with the state courts deciding the overwhelming ma- 
jority of cases and the federal courts exercising some kind of re- 
view of state court decisions involving federal questions. How- 
ever, the present inefficient and time-consuming system must be 
modified. What is needed is a method that will rely more heavily 
on the proven abilities of state judges and the admitted capacity 
of the state judicial systems, while at the same time preserving 
the minimum amount of review necessary to ensure that federal 
questions are properly and uniformly addressed by the state ju- 
dicial systems. State courts must continue to follow and apply 
federal law where necessary, but this can be accomplished with- 
out excessive and disruptive interference by the federal courts. 
VI. THE PROPOSAL: A NATIONAL COURT OF STATE APPEALS 
It is therefore proposed that Congress create a National 
Court of State Appeals consisting of nine judges, appointed by 
the President pursuant to Article I11 of the United States Con- 
stitution, with original appellate jurisdiction to review state 
court decisions, both civil and criminal, in which federal ques- 
tions have been raised and state remedies exhausted. This court 
would consider not only direct appeals from the state's highest 
court, but would have exclusive original jurisdiction over all col- 
lateral attacks on state court decisions (presently filed in the 
federal district courts). This would completely divest the federal 
district courts of jurisdiction to review decisions of state courts 
on federal constitutional questions. It would be a discretionary 
35. Id. at 4. 
36. Meador Speech, supra note 4, at 22. 
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court. I t  would also be a court of entry to the United States Su- 
preme Court from decisions of the state's highest court. 
The concept of a National Court of State Appeals is not 
new. In 1968 the American Bar Foundation first proposed a Na- 
tional Court of Appeals, but the concept provoked little inter- 
est?' Judge Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., proposed a court that 
would have "jurisdiction to review on writs of certiorari federal 
questions in convictions in the state and federal systems in 
which a conviction is called into ques t i~n."~~ The Study Group 
on the Caseload of the United States Supreme Court (The 
Freund Committee) proposed a National Court of Appeals 
which would be a screening court for the United States Supreme 
Court and would be empowered to decide cases of conflicts 
among the circuit courts.ss In 1975 the Commission on Revision 
of the Federal Court Appellate System (The Hruska Commis- 
sion) proposed the establishment of a National Court of Appeals 
that would have reference jurisdiction from the United States 
Supreme Court and transfer jurisdiction from the Court of 
Claims or Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.4o Dean Erwin 
N. Griswold proposed a National Court of the United States 
which would be assigned cases by the United States Supreme 
Court after that court had granted the petition for certiorari." 
All of the proposals for a National Court of Appeals had one 
thing in common. They viewed the problem from the standpoint 
of the federal judiciary and were concerned with relieving the 
pressure on the United States Supreme Court. There is no doubt 
that relief is needed, but if the individual litigant is to be re- 
lieved of the time-consuming process of federal review and if the 
states are to be given the proper guidance by the federal courts, 
then the needs of the state courts should be seriously considered 
in any proposal for reform of federal judicial procedure. For a 
37. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, ACCOMMODATING THE WORKLOAD OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS (1968). See also Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts 
of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the National h w ,  82 HARV. L. 
REV. 542, 598 n.229 (1969). 
38. Haynsworth, A New Court to Improve the Administration of Justice, 59 
A.B.A.J. 841 (1973). 
39. Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, 57 F.R.D. 
573, 573-650 (1972) [hereinafter cited as the Freund Report]. 
40. COMMISSION  REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE 
AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES; RECOMMENDATION FOR CHANGE (1975); Hruska, Commission 
Recommends New National Court of Appeals, 61 A.B.A.J. 819 (1975). 
41. Griswold, Rationing Justice-The Supreme Court's Caseload and What the 
Court Does Not Do, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 335 (1975). 
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National Court of Appeals to be acceptable, the following condi- 
tions must be met: 
1. The United States Supreme Court must remain supreme. 
2. The position and prestige of the state courts must not be 
demeaned. 
3. The federal judiciary should not be unduly expanded. 
4. The new court must be able to attract competent and able 
judges. 
5. The docket of the court must be manageable. 
6. It must be constitutional. 
7. Justice must be done. 
Others, in stating the conditions for the establishment of a 
National Court of Appeals, have stressed the avoidance of a 
fourth tier of federal courts and the avoidance of specializa- 
t i ~ n . ' ~  These stated conditions are examined below in the hopes 
of overcoming some of the objections voiced by opponents of the 
concept of a National Court of State  appeal^.^^ 
42. D. MEADOR, A PROPOSAL TO IMPROVE THE FEDERAL APPELLATE SYSTEM (Office for 
Improvements in the Administration of Justice, 1978); Report No. 2 of the Special Com- 
mittee on Coordination of Judicial Improvements, 99 A.B.A. REP. 306, 307 (1974). 
43. The proposal for a National Court of State Appeals was presented to the Con- 
ference of Chief Justices in Flagstaff, Arizona, in August of 1979, and the Conference 
deferred action. In Chicago, in February of 1980, action was again deferred. At that time, 
Chief Judge Lawrence H. Cooke, Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, spoke 
in opposition based upon inadequate specification of the jurisdiction to be exercised and 
the inability of the court to handle the caseload. Chief Judge Cooke further opposed the 
resolution because: 
3. Such a court would be an additional burden for the taxpayer. 
4. With but one court in the entire country to handle these matters, great 
expense and inconveniences would be visited upon litigants and members of 
the bar, most of whom would be required to travel long distances to the seat of 
the court, wherever that might be. 
5. It would be denigrating to the Supreme Courts of the states and convert 
their status from that of a final arbiter to that of an intermediate appellate 
court. 
6. If the purpose of this new court is to end disparity between decisions of 
existing United States Courts of Appeals, the effort stsrts at the wrong end. 
Rather, there should be created for such a purpose a federal court to review 
the decisions of the federal Courts of Appeals. 
7. Lastly and most importantly, the concept of such a court, as so briefly 
sketched in the resolution, is that, and I quote, "[it] would have jurisdiction to 
review on a discretionary basis criminal and quasi-criminal cases, including ap- 
plications for writs of habeas corpus, presently reviewed by the Federl District 
Courts and the Circuit Courts of Appeal. . . . This jurisdiction would be in 
place of and not in addition to the jurisdiction presently exercised by the Fed- 
eral District Courts and the Circuit Courts of Appeals." Such a concept, with- 
out doubt, would be violative of the United States Constitution. Under Article 
1, section 9, clause 1 thereof, the right of habeas corpus shall not be abridged 
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A. The Supremacy of the United States Supreme Court 
Of prime importance is that the United States Supreme 
Court remain supreme. Final state court decisions involving fed- 
eral questions in criminal cases would bypass review by the fed- 
eral district courts and the United States circuit courts of ap- 
peals but would not avoid review by the United States Supreme 
Court, which would have the ultimate review of these decisions 
and would be the final word on federal law. Two steps and two 
opportunities for federal courts to review state court criminal 
decisions would be replaced by one possible review by the Na- 
tional Court of State Appeals. Review of state court criminal de- 
cisions by the United States Supreme Court would be expedited, 
as there would be only one level of review between the highest 
state court and the United States Supreme Court. Since civil 
cases would also be routed through the National Court of State 
Appeals, there would be uniformity of processing for both civil 
and criminal matters. 
For the United States Supreme Court to remain supreme, 
however, it is not necessary that the Court remain open for 
every matter that is thrust upon it. This is the very reason the 
United States Supreme Court is presently overloaded. This over- 
loading increases the danger that worthy litigants will be over- 
looked in the crush of frivolous and meritless petitions. Two 
procedures will allow the National Court of State Appeals to dis- 
pose of, with finality, the vast majority of cases presented to it 
while providing an avenue for review by the United States Su- 
preme Court of those cases that need the Court's attention. 
First, as suggested by Judge Haynsworth in his proposal for 
a National Court of Appeals and as followed in some states that 
have intermediate courts of appeal, certiorari or appeal from the 
National Court of State Appeals to the United States Supreme 
Court should be allowed only when one or more of the judges of 
the National Court of State Appeals dissent. Since the court will 
have nine judges, presumably of varying shades of philosophy 
A 
by Congress. And that is exactly what such a court as proposed by the resolu- 
tion would do! No longer would the United States District Courts or the 
United States Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction over habeas corpus. This 
National Court of State Review would have such jurisdiction, but only on a 
"discretionary" basis - thus a clear and definite abridgement if there ever was 
one. 
Remarks by Lawrence H. Cooke, Conference of Chief Judges, Chicago, Illinois (Feb. 
1980). 
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and background, it is unlikely that appeal of a worthy case will 
be foreclosed by a unanimous opinion of the National Court of 
State  appeal^.^^ 
Second, a procedure can be provided that would allow the 
parties or the Chief Justice of the National Court of State Ap- 
peals, after briefs have been filed and the matter is ready for 
submission, to petition the United States Supreme Court for 
transfer to that court. The parties would have to show extraordi- 
nary reasons why the matter should be transferred. For example, 
a case like Bakke,'qn which it was apparent to all that it should 
be decided by the United States Supreme Court, could, upon 
request, bypass the National Court of State Appeals and go di- 
rectly to the United States Supreme Court. This method has 
been used effectively in Arizona to bypass the Court of 
 appeal^.^^ 
These two procedures will allow ample opportunity for re- 
view by the United States Supreme Court without placing too 
great a burden on the Court to hear petitions for review of each 
and every case decided by the National Court of State Appeals. 
The National Court of State Appeals would not be independent 
of the United States Supreme court, but subservient and always 
subject to review by the Supreme Court, except when the na- 
tional court's opinion is unanimous. The United States Supreme 
Court would remain supreme but would have to consider a con- 
stitutional question only once, on review or transfer from the 
Id. 
44. Haynsworth, note 38 supra. 
I would cut off the right to apply to the Supreme Court for certiorari to any 
petitioner who did not get a single affirmative vote in the new court. Rejected 
cases of that category are the chaff with which the Supreme Court should not 
be burdened by formal petitions. I cannot believe that any petitioner who fails 
to get a t  least one affirmative vote in the new court could reasonably expect to 
get four affirmative votes in the Supreme Court. This should not foreclose the 
use of screening panels provided the panels are instructed to pass on to the full 
court a petition if its merit or lack of merit is reasonably debatable. 
at 843. 
45. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
46. The Arizona Rules provide: 
19(a) Time for Filing. No later than 10 days after the appeal is a t  issue, any 
party to an appeal pending before the Court of Appeals may petition to the 
Supreme Court to order the transfer of the case to the Supreme Court. 
19(b) Transfer by the Court of Appeals. At any time after the appeal is at issue 
but before oral argument or submission of the appeal, the chief judge of the 
division of the Court of Appeals in which the appeal is pending may petition 
the Supreme Court to order the transfer of the case to the Supreme Court. 
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National Court of State Appeals. 
B. Upholding the Position of State Courts 
A National Court of State Appeals would give speedy and 
consistent finality to state court decisions. It would avoid the 
present, demeaning practice of allowing federal trial judges to 
overturn the state supreme courts in criminal cases. 
This concern with the propriety of a trial court overruling 
an appellate court is not new. The National Advisory Commis- 
sion on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, in recommending 
that challenges to state court convictions be heard only by the 
United States courts of appeals, stated, "That [recommenda- 
tion] is based upon the Commission's view that overturning a 
conviction that has already been upheld by the State's appellate 
court system is a step of such seriousness that it should not be 
performed by a single judge of a court with general trial jurisdic- 
tion."'' With the creation of a National Court of State Appeals, 
only a federal appellate court would be able to review and re- 
verse a state appellate court. 
In civil matters the National Court of State Appeals would 
be able to give greater consideration to the diversity of state 
court procedures and would not be concerned with both federal 
and state procedures. Although the United States Supreme 
Court tries to recognize state court procedures, an appellate 
court with no federal court jurisdiction would be in a better po- 
sition to recognize the rich diversity of state laws and procedures 
which, though different, do not violate federal constitutional 
standards. 
C .  Expansion of the Federal Judiciary 
As can be seen, this proposal would expand the federal judi- 
ciary by only nine judges, a de minimus increase in the number 
of federal judges. While there would be an appellate tier be- 
tween the state's highest court and the United States Supreme 
Court, the number of appellate courts between the federal dis- 
trict courts and the United States Supreme Court would remain 
the same. 
47. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, 
REPORT ON COURTS 131 (1973) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON COURTS]. 
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D. The New Court's Ability to Attract Competent Judges 
Since the National Court of State Appeals would be author- 
ized to take civil as well as criminal cases, it would not be a 
specialized court, a factor which should make service on the 
court more attractive. Service on the National Court of State 
Appeals would be more desirable than service on a court limited 
to criminal jurisdiction, as suggested by Judge Haynsw~rth.~~ 
The judges should be appointed by the President pursuant to 
Article I11 of the United States Constitution. Since the National 
Court of State Appeals would be a truly national court and not a 
regional one, the salary should be greater than that of a judge on 
the United States Court of Appeals to ensure that the highest 
caliber of judge is attracted to the new court.49 
E. The Manageability of the New Court's Docket 
A most critical question concerns the ability of the new 
court to handle the volume of cases that will be presented to it." 
The number of habeas corpus petitions in the federal district 
courts by state prisoners has remained fairly constant over the 
last ten years, as shown by the following chart? 
48. Haynsworth, supra note 38. 
49. The method of selecting the judges of the new court has troubled previous sup- 
porters of a National Court of Appeals and seems to have had a chilling effect on past 
proposals for a national court. This problem could be overcome by providing initially for 
a form of merit selection as recommended by the American Judicature Society, and as 
provided in many states and as was followed in the selection of some federal circuit court 
judges during the Carter administration. There could also be an agreement that there be 
a balanced selection by the President between the political parties when the court is first 
appointed. 
50. It should be kept in mind that the National Court of State Appeals would not 
have jurisdiction over civil rights petitions even if filed by state prisoners. These suits are 
independent actions in the federal district courts and would be reviewed by federal 
courts of appeal, as are all federal cases. 
51. These and other statistics have been obtained from the 1980 Annual Report of 
the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. It is noted that 
while the number of habeas corpus petitions in the federal district courts by state pris- 
oners has remained static, the number of civil rights petitions by state prisoners in fed- 
eral district courts has increased: 
Mandamus and other petitions decreased from 289 in 1975 to 146 in 1980. See ADMINIS- 
TRAnVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 
62, table 21 [hereinafter cited as 1980 ANNUAL REPORT]. 
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It should be remembered that very few of these habeas corpus 
petitions filed by state prisoners are of substance and require 
more than the briefest attention. These cases have been tried in 
the state trial court and have gone through a state appellate pro- 
cess and quite often through state postconviction procedures. 
The issues have been sufkiently refined so that they may be 
easily identified and quickly decided." 
Statistics of the United States Supreme Court are not very 
helpful in determining the source of that Court's work. They do 
indicate, however, that the total number of cases docketed be- 
tween 1976 and 1979 has remained under 5,000:68 
52. A survey of 50 habeas corpus petitions by state prisoners filed in the United 
States District Court in Phoenix, Arizona, showed the following: 
Grounds for Petition (two petitions asserted more than one ground for relief): 
1. Attack of underlying conviction 36 
2. Probation revocation 4 
3. Prison transfer 3 
4. Loss of good time credits in prison 3 
5. Parole eligibility 2 
6. Held in jail after indictment quashed 2 
7. Extradition 1 
8. Medical mistreatment 1 
Thirty of the 50 petitions were dismissed without the court's requiring either a response 
from the defendants or a hearing. The reasons were: 
1. Availability of state remedies 
2. No habeas corpus claim (i.e., wrong 
type of action, lack of jurisdiction, 
or alleged errors not of constitutional dimension) 
3. Issue correctly decided on direct appeal 
4. No specific facts alleged 
5. Claim not related to present confinement 
6. Moot 
7. Claim disposed of previously by 
district court 
Hearings were required in only three cases out of the remaining 20, and in only one case 
was relief granted. That case concerned a prisoner who had been sentenced for contempt 
of court, and that matter was remanded to the state for a new hearing on the contempt. 
53. 1980 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 51, at  A-1, table A-1. 
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The Freund Commission provided more detailed information for 
the 1971-1972 Term? The report showed that out of a total of 
4,371 cases docketed, 1,341, or 30.7%, originated in the state 
courts. Of this number, 445 were civil appeals and 896 were 
criminal appeaW6 
If we assume that both the total caseload of the United 
States Supreme Court (under 5,000 cases a year) and the pro- 
portion of state cases to federal cases in the Court have re- 
mained substantially constant, approximately 1,500 cases pres- 
ently heard by United States Supreme Court would be heard 
instead by the National Court of State Appeals. When this 
figure is combined with the 7,000 or more habeas corpus peti- 
tions presently filed in the federal district courts, the maximum 
potential caseload for the National Court of State Appeals is 
8,500 cases. Such a caseload would, even with excessive resort to 
staff, be prohibitive. It is submitted, however, that the actual 
caseload would be much less. 
It can be assumed that the present number of civil appeals 
from state court decisions will remain the same, about 500 a 
year. The number of criminal cases filed in the National Court 
of State Appeals will not, however, be as high as the number 
now filed in the federal district courts. Significantly fewer state 
prisoners will seek relief in a National Court of State Appeals 
than now seek relief in the federal district court, it is more diffi- 
cult and possibly more intimidating to file in a national court 
than it is to "walk across the street" to the local federal district 
court. Also, a time limit beyond which a state prisoner could not 
appeal from the final decision of the state court would signifi- 
cantly reduce the number of prisoners who could file in the na- 
tional court. 
This willingness or unwillingness of a state prisoner to seek 
relief in a National Court of Appeals cannot be proven conclu- 
sively, but an indication of it can be seen in the statistics com- 
piled by the Freund Commission. For the 1971 Term there were 
1,721 criminal appeals to the United States Supreme Court from 
the United States courts of a p ~ e a l s . ~  What proportion of these 
were state prisoner cases is not known, but the figure indicates 
the number of prisoners, state and federal, who were willing to 
54. Freund Report, supra note 39, at 620, table V. 
55. The term "appeals" includes both regular appeals and petitions for certiorari or 
habeas corpus. 
56. Freund Report, supra note 39, at 620, table V. 
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pursue an appeal to the United States Supreme Court from the 
United States courts of appeals. 
Another indication of the willingness of the state prisoners 
to appeal can be obtained from the number of present appeals to 
the United States courts of appeals from the federal district 
courts by state prisoners. In 1980, there were 1,090 criminal ap- 
peals filed in the United States courts of appeals by state prison- 
ers. In other words, the number of state prisoners who desired to 
proceed further from the ruling of the federal district courts to 
the United States courts of appeals was only slightly more than 
the number of state prisoners (896) who appealed from state 
courts directly to the United States Supreme Court in 1971. 
This may reflect the results of Stone v. Powellw and Wainwright 
v. SykeP8 as well as the relief now believed to be afforded by the 
civil rights petition. The figures do indicate the degree of will- 
ingness of state prisoners to follow the appellate process from a 
state court decision. However, the federal district court is some- 
what different. The district court is nearer, and, being a trial 
court, there is more often the hope that the trial court will con- 
strue contested facts in the petitioner's favor. This is seldom 
done, but the hope blooms eternal. Such expectations do not 
usually extend to appellate courts. 
There is, however, another reason a National Court of State 
Appeals would not have to consider all of the 7,000 cases now 
filed in the federal district courts. That is the certainty of the 
law and its even application. Today, a state prisoner lives in the 
belief that he will find the "right" federal district judge. That 
this rarely happens is immaterial, as long as the belief remains. 
No longer will the prisoner be able to shop for the sympathetic 
judge. The law will be certain, and the prisoner will not file his 
petition in the National Court of State Appeals in hopes of get- 
ting some new or different law. Professor Schuman has stated: 
One reason why such a large percentage of criminal prosecu- 
tions are closed on a guilty plea without trial is that in most of 
these cases there is an extremely visible, rigid, appropriate 
(valid) statutory rule furnishing a standard to support the 
claim of the state and an absence of any standards to support 
the claim of the defendant.6@ 
57. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
58. 420 U.S. 372 (1977). 
59. Schuman, Justification of Judicial Decisions, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 715, 725 (1971). 
568 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I981 
A National Court of State Appeals would apply the federal stan- 
dards in an even, uniform manner to all state prisoners. The 
state prisoners would be denied the hope of the "luck of the 
draw" now available in the federal district courts. 
Civil cases may well provide more of a problem for the court 
because of the substance of the cases. It should be remembered, 
however, that this would be a discretionary court, and even if it 
is assumed that 500 civil appeals a year are filed, not al l  will be 
heard and decided by written opinion. The number of civil cases 
that the National Court of State Appeals would have to con- 
sider, while sufficient to provide a well-rounded and interesting 
docket, would not be so large as to overwhelm the new court?O 
The sum of the three figures discussed above yields an accu- 
rate estimate of the number of criminal appeals that would 
reach the National Court of State Appeals: (1) the number of 
direct criminal appeals by state prisoners to the United States 
Supreme Court in 1971 (896); (2) the number of criminal ap- 
peals by both state and federal prisoners from the United States 
courts of appeals to the United States Supreme Court in 1971 
(1,721); and (3) the number of criminal appeals by state prison- 
ers to the United States courts of appeals from the roughly 7,000 
decisions of the federal district courts in 1980 (1,090). The total 
number of criminal appeals by state prisoners from the decisions 
of the states' highest courts would be considerably less than the 
7,000 cases now filed in the federal district courts. Giving the 
benefit of the doubt to the filing of an appeal, the total number 
of criminal cases appealed to the National Court of State Ap- 
peals by state prisoners should be fewer than 3,000, or three 
times the number of state prisoners who now take the trouble to 
appeal to the United States courts of appeals from the decisions 
of the federal district courts. Adding this figure to the estimated 
60. For consideration of the cases taken by the United States Supreme Court, see 
Hellman, The Supreme Court and Statutory Law: The Plenary Docket in the 19709s, 40 
U. Prrr. L. REV. 1 (1978); Hellman, The Business of the Supreme Court Under the 
Judiciary Act of 1925: The Plenary Docket in the 1970's, 91 W v .  L. h v .  1711 (1978); 
Levin & Hellman, The Many Roles of the Supreme Court and the Constraints of Time 
and Caseload, 7 U. TOL. L. REV. 399 (1976). The national court should also have sufii- 
cient staff to assist in screening the frivolous from the meritorha cases. D. IMEADOR, 
APPELLATE COURTS, TAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF VOLUME 8 (1947); Cameron, 
Central Staff-A New Solution to an Old Problem, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 465 (1976); Le- 
sinski & Stockmeyer, Prehearing Research and Screening in the Michigan Court of Ap- 
peals: One Court's Method for Increasing Judicial Productivity, 26 VANI). L. REV. 1211, 
1213 (1973). 
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civil appeals of 500, we arrive at a conservative estimate of 3,500 
cases, fewer than the United States Supreme Court now 
processes, and a reduction in the United States Supreme Court's 
caseload of some 1,400 cases, or 28%. For a pessimistic projec- 
tion, if we allowed for an appeal to the National Court of State 
Appeals by half of the 7,000 state prisoners who now file in the 
federal district courts, the figure of 4,000 (3,500 criminal appeals 
plus 500 civil appeals) is still less than the United States Su- 
preme Court's present, more substantive caseload. 
F. The Constitutionality of the New Court 
One of the questions raised in opposition to the National 
Court of State Appeals is the constitutionality of depriving the 
federal district courts of the power to issue writs of habeas 
corpus involving state prisoners." This should not be a stum- 
bling block as long as there is an alternative forum that is rea- 
sonably accessible in which petitions for the writs can be heard. 
The Judiciary Act of 1789,62 gave the federal courts the 
power to issue writs of habeas corpus. The issuance of the writ, 
however, was limited only to prisoners held in custody by the 
United States. It would appear that the federal courts at that 
time limited the inquiry in habeas corpus cases to jurisdiction of 
the sentencing ~ourt. '~ It wasn't until 1867, after the Civil War, 
that the scope of the writ was expanded to state prisoners, but 
even then the power was given only to the federal circuit courts 
and not to the federal district courts." Federal circuit courts 
were authorized to give relief "in all cases where any person 
[might] be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the con- 
stitution, or any treaty or law of the United  state^."^^ The scope 
of the writ was further expanded in the case of Frank v. Man- 
gumee to include proceedings in which a state defendant had 
been convicted in a trial which had been mob dominated. The 
scope of the writ was again judicially extended in Brown v. Al- 
Zen6' and in Fay v. Noia." The United States Supreme Court 
61. See note 43 supra. 
62. See note 2 supra. 
63. See Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830). 
64. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385. 
65. Id. 
66. 237 U.S. 309 (1915). 
67. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). 
68. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). 
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recently limited the scope of the writ in Stone v. Powell,69 stat- 
ing, "[Wlhere the State has provided an opportunity for full and 
fair litigation of a fourth amendment claim, the Constitution 
does not require that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas 
corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an uncon- 
stitutional search and seizure was introduced at his trial?O 
Not only has the scope of the writ as to state prisoners been 
restricted by United States Supreme Court decisions, the juris- 
diction to issue the writ has been restricted by Congress. Section 
2255 of the Federal Habeas Corpus Act provides that "an appli- 
cation for writ of habeas corpus . . . , shall not be maintained," 
if the person has not availed himself of federal postconviction 
relief or has been denied such relief? The United States Su- 
preme Court case of Swain v. Pressley7' should be persuasive on 
this question. In that case the Court construed a statute that 
prohibited federal district courts from considering applications 
for writs of habeas corpus brought by a person in custody pursu- 
ant to sentence imposed by the Superior Court of the District of 
Columbia. The United States Supreme Court stated: 
Respondent argues (footnote omitted) that 8 110(g), if read lit- 
erally, violates Art. 1, § 9, cl. 2, of the United States Constitu- 
tion, which provides: 
The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not 
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or In- 
vasion the public Safety may require it. 
His argument is made in two steps: (1) that the substitution of 
a remedy that is not "exactly commensurate" with habeas 
corpus relief available in a district court is a suspension of the 
writ within the meaning of the Clause; and (2) that because the 
judges of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia do not 
enjoy the life tenure and salary protection which are guaran- 
teed to district judges by Art. 111, 8 1, of the Constitution, the 
collateral-review procedure authorized by § 23-110(g) of the 
District of Columbia Code is not exactly commensurate with 
habeas corpus relief in the district courts.7s 
The Supreme Court then held that the federal district court 
69. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
70. Id. at 482. 
71. 28 U.S.C. 5 2255 (1949). See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969); 
Skinner v. Johnson, 224 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 911 (1956). 
72. 430 US.  372 (1977). 
73. Id. at 379-80. 
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could be deprived of habeas corpus jurisdiction as long as alter- 
nate relief was available that was neither inadequate nor 
ineffe~tive.?~ 
Others have had no problem in limiting the use of habeas 
corpus by federal trial courts. The National Advisory Commis- 
sion on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals stated, in stan- 
dard 6.5, that "[c]hallenges to state court convictions made in 
federal courts should be heard by the United States Courts of 
 appeal^."^^ The commentary to standard 6.5 reads: 
The standard also recommends that insofar as defendants con- 
victed in State criminal proceedings have access to Federal 
courts for further review beyond direct review by the U.S. Su- 
preme Court of the State courts' affirmance of the decision, 
they should be permitted to challenge their convictions only in 
the U.S. courts of appeals. This would eliminate further review 
in the U.S. district courts as is presently available.'= 
The National Court of State Appeals would provide the 
habeas corpus petitioner the same relief he presently receives. 
The only practical problem, as the Advisory Commission recog- 
nized, would be that the National Court of State Appeals, being 
an appellate court, could not conveniently hold hearings on is- 
sues of ,fact. Although the federal district courts, in fact, rarely 
do this now, usually relying upon the state record in the matter, 
some cases would need a factual determination to ensure that 
full relief is afforded. The National Advisory Commission on 
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recommended that the 
circuit courts could refer matters to the trial court for factual 
determination where "[tlhe defendant asserts a claim of consti- 
tutional violation which, if well-founded, undermines the basis 
for or the integrity of the entire trial or review proceeding, or 
impairs the reliability of the factfinding process at the trial."77 
Since this would be a National Court of State Appeals, any 
referral for an additional factual determination should be made 
to the state court rather than the federal district court. One of 
the problems with collateral attacks upon state court decisions 
in the federal district courts has been the difference in pleadings 
74. Id. at 383-84. 
75. REPORT ON COURTS, supra note 47, at 128, standard 6.5. 
76. Id. at 131. 
77. Id. at 128, standard 6.5. See also Sumner v. Mata, 101 S. Ct. 764 (1981), which 
held that the federal court had to apply a "presumption of correctness" in reviewing 
factual determinations of the state courts. 
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and the difference in the testimony upon which factual determi- 
nations have been made in the federal court as opposed to those 
already made in the state court. By referring any factual deter- 
mination back to the state court, the National Court of State 
Appeals would be assured that the state court files already in 
existence would be available and thus allow for a more consis- 
tent factual determination. 
In summary, there should be no constitutional impediment 
to taking jurisdiction of habeas corpus petitions by state prison- 
ers away from the federal district courts and giving it to the Na- 
tional Court of State Appeals. 
G.  The New Court's Ability to Achieve Justice 
The thrust of this proposal is to satisfy the primary interest 
of the states in a system of federal review that will function with 
reasonable promptness, uniformity, and absolute finality. The 
cause of justice is served by these same goals. 
There must be an end to litigation. The sooner a matter is 
settled, the sooner the litigants can go on with their business, or 
the sooner a prisoner can concentrate on rehabilitation instead 
of dreaming, as he does now, that somewhere, someday he will 
find a federal district judge who will turn him loose and even 
recompense him for the violation of his civil rights by the state 
court. I t  should be remembered that, in criminal cases, by the 
time a prisoner reaches the federal courts, he has been given 
about all of the due process he is entitled to receive. The defen- 
dant has been found guilty by a jury or has pleaded guilty, often 
as a result of a plea agreement approved by the state court. The 
case has been reviewed by the state's appellate court, and the 
conviction has been affirmed. Frequently he has also been de- 
nied postconviction relief. Chief Justice Burger has noted, in 
discussing the cost and time involved in extended review of 
criminal convictions, "The tragic aspect was the waste and futil- 
ity, since every lawyer, every judge and every juror was fully 
convinced of defendant's guilt from the beginning to the end."78 
And Chief Justice Schaefer of Illinois has stated, "What bothers 
me is that almost never do we have a genuine issue of guilt or 
inno~ence."~" If the chance that a defendant has a valid claim of 
78. Address by Warren E. Burger, Association of the Bar of City of New York 1 
(Feb. 19, 1979); 25 REC. N.Y. CITY B.A. 14, 15-16 (Supp. 1970). 
79. Remarks by Walter v. Schaefer, Conference of the Center for the Study of Dem- 
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reversible error is extremely small, the chance that a defendant 
will have been convicted of a crime that he did not commit will 
be even smaller.80 And the fact that access to the United States 
Supreme Court would be reduced does not mean that justice will 
be denied. Justice Jackson stated: 
[Rleversal by a higher court is not proof that justice is thereby 
better done. There is no doubt that if there were a super-Su- 
preme Court, a substantial proportion of our reversals of state 
courts would also be reversed. We are not final because we are 
infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final?' 
In civil cases, although there are not the same number of 
frivolous appeals, the facts and issues will likewise have been 
distilled to the point that the constitutional questions are read- 
ily apparent, and the National Court of State Appeals could 
quickly decide whether to take the case. Here again the litigant 
has been before the state courts and through the state appellate 
process. The chance that he has been unjustly treated is small. 
Federal appellate review of state civil decisions serves more to 
clarify the law than to prevent injustice in a particular case. 
The proposal of a National Court of State Appeals would 
not be acceptable if, in operation, the court would damage the 
federal system or detract from the supremacy or prestige of the 
United States Supreme Court. This proposal would neither 
harm the federal system nor detract from the position of the 
United States Supreme Court. It would, however, provide an ex- 
tra number of authoritative federal law decisions upon which the 
states and others could rely with a reasonable expectation that 
they are final and binding. 
A National Court of State Appeals could review federal 
ocratic Institutions (June 1968), cited in Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral 
Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U .  CHI.  L. REV. 142, 145 n.12 (1970). 
80. It has been suggested that no petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a state 
prisoner in the federal court should be considered unless there is a colorable claim of 
innocence. There would be, of course, some exceptions to this rule: 
1. Lack of jurisdiction in the traditional sense, for example, double jeopardy. 
2. Where the error is one that could conceal from the trial court and the court 
on appeal the extent of the error: for example, inadequate or no representation 
by counsel, which could not only concern the degree of the crime, but also 
affect the severity of the sentence. 
3. Where there has been a change in basic constitutional law. 
See Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack On Criminal Judgments, 38 U .  
CHI.  L. REV. 142, 151-53 (1970). 
81. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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questions decided by state courts expeditiously and uniformly 
with less cost than is incurred under the present structure. Such 
a court would provide swifter and more consistent justice for the 
people that both the federal and state courts must serve. 
VII. SOME QUESTIONS 
A. Time Limits 
There is a question as to what, if any, time limits should be 
placed upon a person seeking national court review of state 
court decisions. One of the purposes of a National Court of State 
Appeals would be to bring litigation to a conclusion within a rea- 
sonable time. It is proposed that a person seeking relief from a 
decision of the state's highest court be required to do so within 
ninety days of final action by the state court. This should work 
no hardship on the litigant and would ensure that the court 
would not be burdened with reviewing stale decisions. In crimi- 
nal cases, if there is a change in the law or there is newly discov- 
ered evidence, these matters can be first litigated in the state 
courts through state postconviction procedures, and the petition 
to the National Court of State Appeals would be based upon the 
denial of relief by the state's highest court. 
B. Distance and Increased Costs 
Another objection that has been made is the increased costs 
involved in having to travel to the National Court of State Ap- 
peals to argue cases that previously were argued in the local dis- 
trict court or the United States courts of appeals. For some, this 
would admittedly be a burden. But cost alone should not be the 
basis for allowing federal trial judges to sit in judgment of state 
appellate courts. Moreover, there are some solutions to the cost 
factor. First, the enacting legislation could allow the National 
Court of State Appeals to travel and hear cases at selected 
places around the country. This is done by appellate courts in 
many states and has been beneficial to both the court and the 
litigants. Second, with the increased use of technology, provi- 
sions could be made for oral argument by video phone. In- 
creased use of technology and a willingness on the part of the 
National Court of State Appeals to travel should eliminate some 
of the additional costs that may be incurred by the litigants in 
seeking appeal to a national court rather than a federal district 
court. Actually, there will be a saving of both time and cost in 
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most cases in that the litigation route from the state's highest 
court to the National Court of State Appeals and then to the 
United States Supreme Court involves one less step than the 
present procedure from the state's highest court to the Federal 
District Court, to the United States Court of Appeals, and then 
to the United States Supreme Court. All of this usually occurs 
after a prior petition to the United States Supreme Court from 
the state's highest court has been denied by the United States 
Supreme Court. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
There will always be some tension between the federal 
courts and the state courts in the exercise of the supremacy 
clause by the federal judiciary. Accepting this tension as the log- 
ical result of our dual system of courts does not mean that this 
power and obligation on the part of federal courts to review 
state court decisions on federal questions should be used to the 
unnecessary detriment of the state court systems or the litigants. 
State courts are entitled to prompt and consistent review of 
their decisions. They are not now receiving such review and in- 
deed cannot receive it under the present procedure. It may be 
that the burden of multiple review by the federal courts is an 
even greater burden on the federal judiciary than it is on the 
state judiciaries. But it is a burden to both, and there exists in 
both systems a need for reasonably prompt and consistent re- 
view of state court decisions involving federal questions. A Na- 
tional Court of State Appeals would satisfy that need. 
Whatever the mistakes of the past, state courts are aware 
that the federal judiciary will step in when federal constitutional 
law is ignored by the states. Restricting the power of the federal 
district courts to interfere in state appellate court decisions and 
transferring that power to a National Court of State Appeals 
will be a step in ensuring consistency and prompt finality in 
state court decisions. The system and the litigants deserve noth- 
ing less. 
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Total Compilation of Questionnaire Results 
Number of Questionnaires - 500 
Number of Replies - 252 
1. Nature of action: 
Divorce 
Tort 
79 Contract 
7 1 Other 
2. If there were no time or jurisdition problems and you had a choice, 
would have have preferred to file this case in a federal court or in 
the state court? 
Federal court 34 State court 193 No preference 18 
3. Would you please list briefly your reasons. [Not all responded; 
some gave more than one reason.] 
a. Those who prefer to file in federal court (34): 
1. Quicker disposition of cases 
2. Superior procedure 
3. Quality of judges 
4. Quality of federal court system 
5. Individual case assignment method 
6. Larger damage awards 
7. Federal Rules of Evidence 
8. Shorter trials 
9. More apparent authority 
10. Less likelihood of political influence 
b. Those who prefer to file in state court (193): 
Quicker disposition of cases 
Familiarity 
Convenience 
Cooperation with attorneys and litigants 
Jurisdiction 
Jury system (12 jurors and voir dire) 
Local issues best resolved by state courts 
Arrogance of federal courts 
Quality of judges 
Judges know state law 
More efficient system 
Less judicial interference 
Federal court preference for criminal cases 
Inflexible procedure of federal courts 
Small case 
Inexperience with federal courts 
c. Those who gave no preference (18): 
1. Quality of judges equal 
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2. Disposition of cases equally fast 1 
3. Procedural rules identical 1 
4. Simple action 1 
5. Federal judges experienced in state court system 1 
4. In general, do you feel that the interest of your client is better 
served in the federal court or the state court? 
Federal court 33 State court 124 No difference 94 
5. In general, do you believe that the quality of judges is better in 
the federal court or the state court? 
Federal judges 95 State judges 30 No difference 125 
6. Any comments you may wish to make. [Not all responded with 
comments; some made more than one comment.] 
a. Those who thought federal judges were better: 
1. Merit selection system 
2. Preparation 
3. Law clerks better 
4. Superior knowledge 
5. Fairer to out-of-state plaintiffs 
6. Competence 
7. State judge quality uneven 
8. Higher paid 
9. Lower number of federal judges 
10. Pressure on state judges 
11. Dignified 
12. More compassionate on social matters 
b. Those who thought state judges were better: 
Elected, so responsive to needs of community and bar 
More sympathetic to needs of attorneys 
Federal judges arrogant because appointed for life 
Federal judges do not understand state law 
State judges diverse 
State judges allow litigants to litigate 
State courts efficiently administered 
State judges qualified 
c. Those who found no difference: 
1. Quality of judges equal 
2. Federal judges not responsive to public because not 
elected 
3. State judges have more consideration for litigants and 
atttorneys 
4. Federal judges not influenced by local pressure 
5. Federal judges not familiar with local issues 
6. Trial dates earlier in state system 
7. Life appointments encourage omnipotent behavior 
8. Bar is negligent in evaluating judges 
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9. Availability of two court systems is confusing 1 
10. Illinois Rules of Evidence superior to federal rules 1 
11. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be adopted in 
California 1 
12. Federal courts usurp state's control of family matters 1 
7. Those who thought federal judges were better, but 
a. preferred to file in state court 58 
b. felt the best interests of the clients were better served by the 
state court 28 
*The results of the survey in each of the counties individually are on file at the editorial 
offices of the Brigham Young University Law Review. 
